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Introduction 
 
The subject matter of this paper is the principle of pre-emption in Community law. The 
essence of this principle is that – in the sphere of non-exclusive Community competences – it 
makes national legislation created in a certain field void, even if it is not literally contrary to 
Community law, and for Member States also creates an obligation of giving up national 
legislative competences in pre-empted areas. The main reasons for raising the question of pre-
emption at all are that the division of competences between the EC and its Member States is 
very uncertain and the intensity of Community regulation differs in certain areas. I argue that 
the clarification of the precise conditions of Community law pre-emption will get us closer to 
settling the constant battle between national and Community competences, one of the basic 
issues of Community law. 
In the theory of Community law, the concept of the principle of pre-emption is less 
elaborated, especially in comparison with the doctrines of supremacy or direct effect, yet the 
European Court of Justice tends to apply this concept. When examining the pre-emption 
situations in Community law, apart from the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, we can also 
rely on some significant Community law commentators who have dealt with this topic since 
the early 1980s. 
In the following, I will attempt to describe Community law pre-emption in a nutshell. In the 
first part of my paper I wish to deal with the concept of the pre-emption doctrine and present 
different ideas in this regard. Afterwards, I intend to outline some pre-emption typologies 
based on the jurisprudence of the Court and Community law literature. 
 
I. The concept of pre-emption 
 
There exists no uniform opinion concerning the definition of pre-emption in Community law. 
Neither Community law commentators nor the Court of Justice succedded in elaborating a 
generally accepted definition. Indeed, the Court does not even use the term ”pre-emption” in 
its judgments. The principle of pre-emption also exists in the federative system of the United 
States of America, but obviously the doctrine elaborated by American scholars and applied by 
the American Supreme Court shows some differences as compared to its equivalent in 
Community law. So the American definition cannot be properly used in relation to 
Community law matters.
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Community law commentators dealing with the principle of pre-emption agree that it is 
closely linked to the principle of supremacy of Community law, but is different from it. Since 
the concept of pre-emption is not well elaborated in Community law, we do not know the 
precise conditions of the situations where pre-emption arises. Indeed, in some cases both a 
supremacy and a pre-emption analysis are available. According to the general opinion, the 
first expression of pre-emption by the Court of Justice was made in the famous Simmenthal 
case
3
, which is also known as a significant judgment concerning the principle of supremacy. 
In Simmenthal the Court stated that in case of conflict between national and Community 
dispositions, Community law on one hand renders inapplicable the national provision, and on 
the other hand ”precludes the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to the extent 
to which they would be incompatible with Community provisions.”4 We have to note that in 
some authors’ opinion5 the first case where the pre-emption question arose was Walt 
Wilhelm
6
, when the European Court stated that national authorities cannot apply their 
  
domestic legislation to agreements falling within the scope of Art. 85 EC (now Art. 81), if it 
conflicts with a Commission decision granting an exemption. 
 
If we look at the different definitions of pre-emption used by Community law commentators, 
we can see that they approach the question from two basic directions: the legislative 
competences of the EC and Member States on one hand, and the conflict of Community and 
Member State laws on the other. In other words, we can consider pre-emption situations as 
conflicts of competences and also as conflicts of norms. 
In certain authors’ opinion the concept of pre-emption is a means of determining legislative 
competence while the principle of supremacy serves for solving a conflict between 
Community and Member State legislation.
7
 So in this opinion pre-emption settles conflicts of 
competences between the Community and its Member States, which conflict must be settled 
by giving precedence to the Community competence (i.e. Community law), if the conditions 
of the pre-emptive effect are fulfilled. This way by applying a pre-emption analysis a norm 
conflict analysis (i.e. supremacy) does not have to be applied. Looking at the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice we can see that in some cases the Court uses a pre-emption analysis 
instead of applying the supremacy principle without differentiating between the two concepts. 
We can also meet definitions according to which pre-emption makes parallel or concurrent 
Community competences exclusive,
8
 but this concept is not a general one since it refers solely 
to some pre-emption situtatons. 
Other theoreticians in turn represent the viewpoint that both pre-emption and supremacy deal 
with exempting conflicts between Community law and national legislation.
9
 Here the two 
concepts are linked more closely because the point of these ideas is that pre-emption 
determines whether there is a conflict between national and EC law, while supremacy 
concerns the manner in which such a conflict is to be resolved. So by applying a pre-emption 
analysis we can decide if a conflict exists at all, and if it does, we have to exempt it by giving 
precedence to Community law based on its supremacy. According to this idea it is pre-
emption that sets supremacy into operation, pre-emption precedes supremacy in the temporal 
sense. The advantage of this concept might be that by applying supremacy the national 
legislation is not rendered void, so it remains operable in domestic legal situations.
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 At the 
same time, the acceptance of this concept does not help us tackle the difficulties of the 
division of powers within the EC legal system, which should be the main purpose of the 
principle of pre-emption. 
 
No matter which approach we accept, we get to the point that if a Member State has no 
competence to legislate because Community law has already have (so the area is pre-empted), 
the given national legislation cannot be applied. We cannot say after all that there is no 
difference between the two concepts outlined above. There is a great difference between the 
non-application and the invalidation of national legislation based on its incompatibility with 
EC law. At the same time, if we accept the „conflict of rules” idea and apply supremacy to the 
resolution of conflicts of powers, national powers may be shifted to the Community of an 
unnecessary degree, which makes this concept less favorable than the concept of ”competence 
conflict”.11 We can say that the price of the retention of national competences from the EC is 
the possibility of the invalidation of national legislation in case it is found to be contrary to 
Community law. 
 
II. Pre-emption situations in Community law 
 
The principle of pre-emption arises in different legal situations. Commentators of Community 
law set up different categories of these situations and the range of these types differs 
  
depending on the applied concept of pre-emption. Recently, authors have specified a wider 
range of pre-emption situations than early commentators. These categories follow the degree 
of conflict between national and Community law (or national and Community competence if 
you will), which ranges from hypothetical frictions to literal contradictions. These categories 
may differ also on the basis, namely, that some situations derive from a certain disposition of 
secondary Community law while in other cases the pre-emptive effect of Community 
legislation is based on judicial interpretation where the final word is said by the Court of 
Justice. 
 
We can take into consideration the pre-emption situations which are based on secondary 
Community law. These situations, however, are easy to settle, and some scholars do not even 
consider them as pre-emption situtations.
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 This category of the so-called express pre-emption 
contains two subcategories. Some measures of secondary Community law include 
dispositions which expressly preserve certain Member State legislative authority – we can call 
it „express saving”.13 Some measures in turn contain a prohibition of Member State 
legislation in the scope of the Community norm – it is called „express pre-emption”.14 
More interesting situations are the so-called implied pre-emption cases when secondary 
Community law does not indicate expressly, if it intends to have a pre-emptive effect or not, 
so this effect can be stated solely by interpretation. From the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice three basic implied pre-emption situations can be outlined. In its significant judgment 
CERAFEL
15
 (without using the term „pre-emption”) the Court stated that certain national 
measures are inapplicable, if one of the following three conditions is fulfilled: (1) if the 
national law affects a matter with which Community law has dealt exhaustively; (2) if the 
national rules are contrary to provisions of Community law; or (3) if the national law 
interferes with the proper functioning of Community law. These three types of situations are 
the basic instances where the Court of Justice may consider that Community law pre-empts 
national law. However, the Court did not determine the conditions by which it would decide 
which pre-emption analysis would be applied. 
 
The first situation is called field pre-emption in Community law terminology. The Court of 
Justice has not adopted explicit standards on the application of this analysis but looking at the 
jurisprudence we can point it out that when Community legislation is found to be 
”exhaustive”16 or to constitute ”a complete system”17, the Court might conclude pre-emption. 
It is not settled though which conditions must be fulfilled so that it could be stated that 
Community legislation is exhaustive, so it would be quite uncertain to tell in advance in 
relation to a certain field of regulation if it is exhaustive. 
The Court tends to state field pre-emption in many cases regarding the Common 
Angricultural Policy considering that this area is largely regulated. The first case where such 
an analysis was applied was that of the Apple and Pear Development Council. This Council 
was established by the British Minister for Agriculture and was authorized to make 
recommendations concerning the size of the fruit marketed by growers, which 
recommendations went beyond what was required by the Community quality standards. 
Related to this issue, the Court ruled that ”the rules on the common organization of the market 
in fruit and vegetables provide for an exhaustive system of quality standards”18, so the 
Member States or its bodies were prevented from imposing unilateral provisions on the 
quality of fruit. In Bulk Fruit
19
 the question was the interpretation of a Community Regulation 
requiring Belgian producers to indicate the minimum net weight and the number of units on 
bulk packages of certain vegetables. The Belgian legislation prescribed this obligation for all 
agricultural products. The Belgian rule was not in actual conflict with the Regulation, still the 
  
Court stated that Belgium had no legislative power here since the common organization of the 
fruit and vegetable market is of an exhaustive nature. 
In situations alike all Member State regulation of the given field is superseded and Member 
States lose their legislative competence in this field, although the Court does not certainly find 
any normative tension between national and Community law, which makes it the most 
powerful format of Community pre-emption. Apart from this, it is the most frequently applied 
pre-emption analysis out of the three. 
 
The second situation indicated in the CERAFEL judgment is called rule pre-emption or direct 
conflict pre-emption. Here appears the most concrete level of normative conflict when a 
national rule is directly contrary to Community legislation. In each case Community law must 
prevail over the national rule, which makes this type very similar to a supremacy analysis. 
Actually, it is for the Court of Justice to choose the reasoning it wishes to apply for justifying 
the exclusion of national law. Theoretically though there should be a difference between these 
two types of reasoning, since applying a pre-emption analysis in case of a norm conflict 
means giving precedence to the regulatory authority of the Community, while applying 
supremacy equals to giving precedence to the Community norm. So the application of a pre-
emption analysis instead of a supremacy reasoning in case of a norm conflict could allow a 
better arranged division of powers within the EC and the Member States. In a case of a non-
exclusive Community competence this is the modality of pre-emption which assures the most 
the existence of the competition of the Community and national legal orders, since it 
invalidates national law only in case of its definitive incompatibility with Community law, 
which is in line with the principle of subsidiarity as well.
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Rule pre-emption tends to arise in cases where Member States – during the implementation of 
secondary Community law – add extra conditions which limit the Community law’s impact 
and that is where conflict appears. For example, a Commission v. Ireland case
21
 concerned 
directives which established certain advantages for international travellers. The Irish 
implementation legislation, however, added an extra disposition to these Community 
dispositions, namely that travellers had to stay in the country for at least 48 hours to gain the 
advantages. The Directives did not provide for this requirement, and the Court concluded that 
the Irish disposition limited the rights of travallers, so it was stated incompatible with 
Community law. 
 
The Court of Justice mentioned a third pre-emption situation in the CERAFEL judgment, the 
so-called obstacle pre-emption. This kind of analysis comes into operation when a Member 
State measure poses some obstacle to certain Community objectives or interferes with the 
proper functioning of Community law, which leads to the voidance of the given national 
measure. An example of the application of this analysis can be found in the Grosoli 
judgment
22
 which was again a case dealing with agricultural matters. The subject-matter of 
the case concerned the Italian legislation which fixed maximum retail prices for frozen beef 
and veal. The Court of Justice concluded that such a national disposition was ”incompatible 
with the common organization of the market in beef and veal to the extent to which it 
endangers the objectives or the operation of that organization.”23 In Danis24 a similar 
reasoning was applied in relation to the common organization of the market in cereals. The 
question arose in a criminal proceeding against producers and traders of animal feeding-
stuffs, who were accused of increasing their prices several times in 8 months without 
notifying the competent minister about their action. The Court first concluded that such a 
national system of price control constituted a measure having an effect equivalent to a 
quantitative restriction, but it also stated that such a system was contrary to the common 
  
organization of the market in cereals as well, if ”in the opinion of the national court, (...) it 
jeopardizes the objectives and functioning of the common organization.”25 
In some authors’ opinion it is the pre-emption analysis which is the most appropriate because 
it does not involve invalidating all the Member State legislation but only the specific national 
measure at issue. Consequently it is less restrictive than field pre-emption.
26
 Moreover, it 
leaves the national authorities the opportunity to create law which meets the requirements of 
Community law. It is also true, though, that a wide range of national legislative measures can 
be rendered void by applying this analysis since any obstacle that limits the effectiveness of 
the Community legislation can create a conflict with EC law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper attempted to give a general overview of Community pre-emption which is 
considered to be a basic element of the constitution of the European Community, even though 
it is still ”in an evolutionary stage”27. It is for the Court of Justice and Community law 
commentators in the future to make a uniform and well-elaborated doctrine out of the rather 
contingent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. In my opinion the clear discernment of pre-
emption from the supremacy principle would contribute to a more settled division of 
competences within the Community. 
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